Unify auth into refresh-token cookie sessions; server-authoritative nodes and Cyberhack

Auth was effectively broken for every login path: the Telegram handler
built a Set-Cookie header but never attached it to the response, and
Ghost Protocol (seed) login never set a cookie at all — so billing, the
game, and admin actions never actually worked once the frontend was fixed
to stop trying to read an HttpOnly cookie from JS. Replaced the bare
10-minute JWT with AuthService::issue_session: a 15-minute access cookie
plus a rotating 30-day refresh cookie (opaque token, only its SHA-256
hash stored in the new refresh_sessions table); reusing an already-
rotated refresh token now revokes every session for that user. CSRF/CORS
origin allowlists moved from a single hardcoded domain to env-configured
lists so the same session works across the landing and account subdomains.
The bot's WebApp deep links (Личный Кабинет/Тарифы/Синдикат) now bridge
through a short-lived bootstrap token exchanged via POST /auth/exchange
instead of a bare access token in the URL.

Nodes: /nodes/routing now serializes the tunnel_* fields, public_key,
sni_domain and a one-time session token gated on an active subscription
instead of a stub ip/port/protocol list; node provisioning returns 202
immediately and finishes in the background instead of blocking the
request for the whole SSH run; a new background task TCP-pings nodes
every 60s and flips online/offline itself; admin can now force-restart a
node over SSH.

Billing: TON exchange rate is cached in Redis (60s) instead of hitting
TonAPI on every invoice, and the request/response now actually uses the
requested currency and TonAPI's real (uppercase) key casing — previously
only USD/RUB were ever requested and the lookup used the wrong case, so
non-USD/RUB plans could never price correctly.

Cyberhack: the server now generates and stores the board itself and
replays the client's raw click path to compute the score, instead of
clamping a client-reported number — closes the "final score is whatever
the browser sends" hole flagged in the security audit.

Frontend: api.ts no longer tries to read the HttpOnly session cookie from
JS (that never worked) and instead relies on same-origin credentials plus
a silent refresh-and-retry on 401; AdminDashboard's restart/delete actions
are wired up; Auth.tsx drops the artificial delays and requires an
explicit seed download/confirmation before continuing, since a lost Ghost
seed is unrecoverable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/modules/auth/guard.rs

@@ -47,9 +47,21 @@ pub async fn auth_guard(
         let origin = req.headers().get("Origin").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
         let referer = req.headers().get("Referer").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
 
-        let is_valid_origin = origin == Some("https://netrunner-vpn.com");
+        let is_valid_origin = origin
+            .map(|o| {
+                state
+                    .csrf_allowed_origins
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|allowed| allowed == o)
+            })
+            .unwrap_or(false);
         let is_valid_referer = referer
-            .map(|r| r.starts_with("https://netrunner-vpn.com"))
+            .map(|r| {
+                state
+                    .csrf_allowed_origins
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|allowed| r.starts_with(allowed.as_str()))
+            })
             .unwrap_or(false);
 
         if !is_valid_origin && !is_valid_referer {