Telegram Login Widget в браузере требует именно порт 443 — его CSP
frame-ancestors от oauth.telegram.org не учитывает порт домена и всегда
подразумевает дефолтный порт схемы, поэтому на 8443 виджет рендерился, но
iframe блокировался как cross-origin. VPN-нода, ранее занимавшая 443 на
dev VPS, перенесена на другой порт, так что конфликта больше нет.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bot buttons that open a Web App (Личный Кабинет/Тарифы/Синдикат) appeared
to load and then silently do nothing on the dev stand. Root cause:
teloxide's WebAppInfo::url (and the underlying Bot API) requires an HTTPS
URL — Telegram's client refuses to render a Web App served over plain
HTTP, with no error surfaced to the user, just a stuck loading state.
WEB_APP_BASE_URL was http://dev.netrunner-vpn.com:8080.
Port 443 on the dev VPS is already in use by a VPN node, and port 80 is
closed, so a normal HTTP-01 ACME challenge won't work. Added a custom
Caddy build (caddy-dns/cloudflare) terminating TLS via DNS-01 on port
8443 instead, reverse-proxying to the existing plain-HTTP app container.
WEB_APP_BASE_URL and the CORS/CSRF allowlists now point at the :8443
origin, and COOKIE_SECURE reverts to true (the default, matching prod) —
now that the backend actually has real TLS to serve it over, we no
longer need the plain-HTTP workaround introduced for the earlier
cookie-drop bug. Verified the custom image builds and the Caddyfile
validates (only the dummy Cloudflare token used for the local test is
rejected, as expected).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Telegram Login Widget refuses to run on a raw IP ("Bot domain invalid")
— BotFather's /setdomain only accepts an actual domain name. Switched
WEB_APP_BASE_URL and the landing origin in CORS/CSRF allowlists to
dev.netrunner-vpn.com (DNS A-record -> 45.76.161.137), and called out
explicitly that the dev bot must be a separate BotFather bot from prod —
reusing the prod bot's username on this host was guaranteed to fail since
its domain is already registered to the real prod domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Auth was effectively broken for every login path: the Telegram handler
built a Set-Cookie header but never attached it to the response, and
Ghost Protocol (seed) login never set a cookie at all — so billing, the
game, and admin actions never actually worked once the frontend was fixed
to stop trying to read an HttpOnly cookie from JS. Replaced the bare
10-minute JWT with AuthService::issue_session: a 15-minute access cookie
plus a rotating 30-day refresh cookie (opaque token, only its SHA-256
hash stored in the new refresh_sessions table); reusing an already-
rotated refresh token now revokes every session for that user. CSRF/CORS
origin allowlists moved from a single hardcoded domain to env-configured
lists so the same session works across the landing and account subdomains.
The bot's WebApp deep links (Личный Кабинет/Тарифы/Синдикат) now bridge
through a short-lived bootstrap token exchanged via POST /auth/exchange
instead of a bare access token in the URL.
Nodes: /nodes/routing now serializes the tunnel_* fields, public_key,
sni_domain and a one-time session token gated on an active subscription
instead of a stub ip/port/protocol list; node provisioning returns 202
immediately and finishes in the background instead of blocking the
request for the whole SSH run; a new background task TCP-pings nodes
every 60s and flips online/offline itself; admin can now force-restart a
node over SSH.
Billing: TON exchange rate is cached in Redis (60s) instead of hitting
TonAPI on every invoice, and the request/response now actually uses the
requested currency and TonAPI's real (uppercase) key casing — previously
only USD/RUB were ever requested and the lookup used the wrong case, so
non-USD/RUB plans could never price correctly.
Cyberhack: the server now generates and stores the board itself and
replays the client's raw click path to compute the score, instead of
clamping a client-reported number — closes the "final score is whatever
the browser sends" hole flagged in the security audit.
Frontend: api.ts no longer tries to read the HttpOnly session cookie from
JS (that never worked) and instead relies on same-origin credentials plus
a silent refresh-and-retry on 401; AdminDashboard's restart/delete actions
are wired up; Auth.tsx drops the artificial delays and requires an
explicit seed download/confirmation before continuing, since a lost Ghost
seed is unrecoverable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nineap
Kirill